Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 44
Number 4 Summer 2017

Article 3

1-1-2017

Constitutional Implications on Block Pricing in the
California Water Market
Deeba Fahami

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Deeba Fahami, Constitutional Implications on Block Pricing in the California Water Market, 44 Hastings Const. L.Q. 455 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol44/iss4/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Constitutional Implications on Block Pricing
in the California Water Market
by

DEEBA FAHAMI*

Introduction
Temperatures are warming, sea levels are rising, and heat waves are
intensifying. The effects of global climate change are indisputable and the
extent of these effects will continue to increase overtime. California, in
particular, has experienced the realities of climate change with the recent
Although
historic drought that threatens California's water supply.
droughts are a feature of California's climate, climate change models
predict increases in the intensity and frequency of droughts.' California
needs to prepare for the challenges of diminishing snowpack and increased
rainfall variability. 2 Water supply management strategies should be
implemented to reflect the increasing scarcity of fresh water and in
anticipation to the changing hydrology and population growth.3
This Note encourages block water pricing structures as an
economically and environmentally efficient pricing mechanism to integrate
More
climate change into California water supply management.
specifically, this Note clarifies the judicial bounds of implementing block
water pricing structures and explains the ramifications of the Fourth

* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.S. 2013,
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank my family whose love and support
motivates me every day. I would also like to thank Professor Dave Owen and Professor David
Takacs for comments on earlier drafts. All errors are attributable to me only.
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District Court of Appeal decision, Capistrano Taxpayers Association, Inc.
v. City of San Juan Capistrano ("Capistrano"), on municipalities' water
pricing systems.
This Note concludes that Capistrano's overbroad
language casts constitutional doubt on conservation pricing structures and
the notion that block-pricing structures can still comply with the terms set
forth in the California Constitution. Moving forward, municipalities should
take extra precaution in justifying each consumption level while taking into
consideration future water supply.

I.

Climate Change and California Water Supply

Since the 1980s, average global temperatures have been significantly
higher than temperatures in the previous fifty years. Annual average
temperatures have increased by about 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit per century.4
In fact, the warmest year on record was 2016, with sixteen of the seventeen
warmest years on record occurring since 2001." Global climate is projected
to continue to change over this century and beyond; 6 even if all greenhouse
gas emissions ceased today, some of the effects of climate change will be
unavoidable. Greenhouse gases that have already been emitted are likely
to remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years, and temperatures
would likely continue to escalate following the cessation of emissions.8
These increased temperatures significantly affect our water resources.
Global warming reduces snowfall, causes snowpack to melt earlier with
higher winter runoff and winter floods, raises water temperatures, and
amplifies the severity of droughts. 9
California has already begun to experience the realities of climate
Over the last one hundred years, a sea level rise of
change.' 0

4. Id; OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, INDICATORS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA 38 (2013), http://oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/pdf/Climate

ChangeIndicatorsReport2013.pdf.
5. Press Release, NASA, NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record
Globally (Jan.
18, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-data-show-2016warmest-year-on-record-globally.
6. The Consequences of Climate Change, NASA (last updated March 27, 2017), http://
climate.nasa.gov/effects/.
7.

PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 2, at 1.

8. Vince Stricherz, If Greenhouse Gas Emissions Stopped Now, Earth Still Would Likely
Get Warmer, UW TODAY (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/02/15/ifgreenhouse-gas-emissions-stopped-now-earth-still-would-likely-get-warmer/.
9.

10.

PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 3.

Id.
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approximately eight inches has been recorded at the Golden Gate Bridge."
Although there is no clear trend in annual precipitation in California,12
The Sierra
precipitation was about 70% below average in 2013.13
snowpack, an important source of water supply, has decreased by 10% in
the past one hundred years and is expected to decrease by as much as 25%
by 2050.14 And in 2015, the Sierra snowpack dipped to its lowest level in
five hundred years.' 5 The increased temperatures combined with decreased
winter snowfall and early rainwater runoff present a major threat to
California's water supply.
With the recent historic drought in California, this threat is becoming
a reality. On January 17, 2014, California Governor Edmund "Jerry"
Brown Jr. proclaimed a State of Emergency due to the severe drought
conditions. 16 On April 25, 2014, Governor Brown proclaimed a Continued
State of Emergency as a result of the sustained drought. 7 These severe
conditions have presented challenges to drinking water access in
communities, water supply for agricultural production, habitat for fish and
wildlife species, wildfire risks, and saltwater contamination to fresh water
In response, Governor
supplies in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.
Brown signed an executive order on April 1, 2015, to implement water
conservation and urged water suppliers to develop rate structures and other
pricing mechanisms to maximize water conservation consistent with
statewide water restrictions.1 9
Despite these conservation efforts,
California entered its fifth straight year of drought in 2016.20 Governor
Brown reinstated these executive orders on May 9, 2016, and established a
new water-use efficiency framework for California that bolstered the state's
drought resilience and preparedness by establishing longerterm water

11.

CALIFORNIA

AIR

RESOURCES

BOARD,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

SCOPING PLAN:

A

FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE 10 (2008), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted
scopingplan.pdf.
12.

OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 63.

13.

Id.

14.

CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, supra note 11, at 10.

15. Michael Casey, Sierra Nevada Snowpack Lowest in 500 Years, CBS NEWS (Sept. 14,
2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sierra-nevada-snowpack-lowest-in-500-years/.
16. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1. 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15
ExecutiveOrder.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id at 3.
20. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-37-16 (May 9, 2016), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/5.9.16
Executive Order.pdf.
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conservation measures.
Early rains in 2017 have provided an
encouraging start to the year, and on April 7, 2017, Governor Brown
terminated the drought state of emergency for all counties in California
except Fresno, Kings, Tulare, and Tuolumne.2 2 Despite the official ending
of the drought state of emergency, the hydrological effects of the drought
will take years to recover from.23
In light of the historic five-year drought, Californians should continue
discretionary use of the state's water resources to mitigate the effects of
climate change.
Tiered water pricing, in particular, is an effective
regulatory control to encourage water conservation. 24 This Note supports
progressive block-pricing structures and explains the legal precedent that
governs its implementation.

II. Price Mechanisms as a Market Solution for Diminished
Water Supply
In basic economic theory, the market price of a good is set where the
demand meets supply. Achieving the economically efficient allocation of a
particular good occurs when profits are maximized. Put differently, the
optimal allocation of a good occurs when total benefits are maximized
while reducing the total costs. Unlike most commodities, however, water
is a finite and vulnerable resource that is essential to sustain life,
development, and the environment.2 5 Water has therefore, been excluded
from market competition and is generally not priced at market rates.26
Instead, where water is provided by a local public agency, water rates
generally only allow the agency to recover the cost of providing the
service.27 California applies this "at-cost" requirement very strictly.

21. Id.
22. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-40-17 (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.7.17_ExecOrder B-40-17.pdf
23. Is the Drought Over?, USGS (last updated Apr. 18, 2017), https://ca.water.usgs.gov
/data/drought/ (stating that groundwater aquifer recovery has not been remedied by the recent
weather); Paul Rogers, How the DroughtChangedCaliforniaForever, THE MERCURY NEWS (Apr.15,
2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/04/15/how-the-drought-changed-californiaforever/.
24. State Water Board Drought Year Actions: Conservation Water Pricing, CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD (Oct. 26,

2016), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/waterissues/programs/drought/pricing/
25. International Conference on Water and the Environment, The Dublin Statement on Wa
ter and Sustainable Development (Jan. 26-31, 1992), www.undocum ents.net/h2o-dub.htm.
26. Gregory S. Weber, A New Water Accounting, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 797 (2013).
27. Id.
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In 1996, California adopted Proposition 218, which added Article XIII
C and Article XIII D to the California Constitution. 2 8 These amendments
protect taxpayers by limiting the methods in which local governments can
create or increase tax, fees, and charges without taxpayer consent.29
Proposition 218 established substantive limitations for fees and charges
levied "as an incident of property ownership" or for a "property-related
service., 30 Water rates and other service fees for ongoing delivery imposed
on current customers of a public agency are fees and charges subject to
Proposition 218.31 In accordance with these provisions, a property-related
fee must meet all the requirements set forth in Article XIII D, sections
6(b)(1)-(5):
(1) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not
exceed the funds required to provide the property related
service.
(2) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not be
used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or
charge was imposed.
(3) The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel
or person as an incident of property ownership shall not
exceed the proportionalcost of the service attributable to
the parcel.
(4) No fee or charge may be imposed for a service unless
that service is actually used by, or immediately available
to, the owner of the property in question. Fees or charges
based on potential or future use of a service are not
Standby charges, whether characterized as
permitted.
charges or assessments, shall be classified as assessments
and shall not be imposed without compliance with Section
4.

28.

What is Proposition218?, CALIFORNIA TAX DATA, http://www.califomiataxdata.com/

pdf/proposition21 8.pdf.
Id.; CAL. CONST. art. XIII C.
29.
30. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, §§ 3-4, 6. In addition, Proposition 218 creates two procedural
requirements that public water agencies must fulfill before adopting a property-related fee or
charge: (1) the agency must conduct a public hearing on the proposed change in rates, fees, or rate
structure; and (2) property-related fees except those for water, sewer, or refuse collection services
must be approved by local voters. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6, cl. a & c.
31. Bighom-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220, 225-26 (Cal. 2006).
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(5) No fee or charge may be imposed for general
governmental services including, but not limited to, police,
fire, ambulance or library services, where the service is
available to the public at large in substantially the same
manner as it is to property owners. Reliance by an agency
on any parcel map, including, but not limited to, an
assessor's parcel map, may be considered a significant
factor in determining whether a fee or charge is imposed as
an incident of property ownership for purposes of this
article. In any legal action contesting the validity of a fee
or charge, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate
compliance with this article. 32
Proposition 218 places limitations on the revenue collected from
property-related fees and the allocation of costs recovered by such fees and
charges to ensure that water customers are not charged more than the
proportional cost of supplying water to a particular parcel. 33 In short,
Proposition 218 requires that municipalities charge at-cost water prices,
unless there is approval by popular vote that allows otherwise. 34
Although politically popular, at-cost water prices 35 set by an agency or
municipality have been historically underpriced. 36 At-cost pricing values
water at the fixed costs of delivery, which encompasses only operation and
maintenance costs. 37 This price fails to take into account the costs of the
negative externalities of water supply such as environmental detriment,
intergenerational equity, and scarcity.
At-cost pricing misrepresents
water's value because it assumes that water itself is free. As a result, atcost pricing fails to discourage water waste. 3 9 Greater efficiency is needed
32. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6, cl. (b)(1)5) (emphasis added).
33. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Natural Resources Defense
Council and Planning and Conservation League; Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants,
Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015) (No. G048969), 2014 WL 2680792.
34.
35.
prices.

Weber, supra note 26, at 797.
For the purposes of this Note, "water price(s)" refers to public municipal or utility water

36. Weber, supra note 26, at 798.
37. Id.
38. See Bourree Lam, Finding the Right Pricefor Water, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/finding-the-right-price-for-water/388246/.
39. Water presents a classic tragedy of the commons scenario: In pursing their best
interests, a rational man or woman will deplete resources without limitations. The freedom to
deplete resources results in ruin for all as finite resources are depleted to exhaustion. See Garrett
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to prepare for increased pressures on fresh water resources as a result of
climate change.
A market-based solution to cost recovery in the water market is a
tiered (or increasing block) pricing structure. 40 In block pricing, the rate
per unit of water increases as the volume of consumption increases. 41 The
first tier is charged the lowest rate, the next tier is charged a higher rate,
This system encourages conservation because it
and so forth.42
disincentivizes heavy water use. 43 It also appeals to societal objectives to
ensure that people enjoy affordable water by providing low water users
with the lowest price." This pricing scheme is criticized, however, for
potential hardships placed on low-income families 45 who must pay a set
rate regardless of their consumption." Despite this, studies have confirmed
that block water pricing encourages water efficiency while addressing
equity concerns and keeping the overall prices low.

47

As a result of water conservation concerns, California water utilities
have increasingly adopted tiered water pricing structures.48 By 2006, about
half of California's population lived in a service area with tiered rates, and
the number of service areas have increased in response to drought
conditions. 49 All ten large investor-owned water utilities in California
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243 (1968). With the increasing population and
reductions in water supply from climate change, our water supply is diminishing at a faster rate
than natural forces are able to replenish the water supply.
40. Janny Choy, Pricing Water for Conservation Using Tiered Water Rates Structures:
Q&A with Stanford Economics Professor Frank Wolak, STANFORD: WATER IN THE WEST

(Apr. 24, 2015), http://waterinthewest.stanford.eduL/news-events/news-press-releases/pricingwater-conservation-using-tiered-water-rates-structures-qa.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43.
Water Pricing - Increasing Block Tariffs, SUSTAINABLE SANITATION & WATER
MANAGEMENT, http://www.sswm.info/content/water-pricing-increasing-block-tariffs.

44. Id
45. A Primer on Water Pricing in the San Diego Region, EQUINOX CENTER 5 (Oct. 2009),
https://cnergycenter.org/sites/default/files/Equinox%20WaterPricingBrief%20102609.pdf.
46. In turn, this could encourage low water consumers to consume more water up to the
point where their consumption would place them in a higher tier.
47. A study done by Kenneth Baerenklau, Associate Professor of Environmental
Economics and Policy at the University of California, Riverside, showed that average
household's water use was approximately 15% below what it would have been under a flat price
structure with equivalent average prices and that the average price paid for water rose only 4%
under water budgets. Flat rate prices would have had to increase by 30% to get the same 15%
reduction. lqbal Pittalwala, An Innovative Approach to Promote Water Use Efficiency, UCR
TODAY (Feb. 19, 2014), http://ucrtoday.ucr.edu/20653.
48. Id.
49. Brian Gray, Payingfor Water in California: The Legal Framework, 65 HASTINGS L.J.
1603, 1635 (2014).
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adopted tiered rate structures in the late 2000s.5o Adopting tiered prices as
part of municipal water rate reform promotes conservation in a flexible and
fiscally responsible way.
The California Legislature expressly authorizes water suppliers to use
allocation-based conservation pricing, such as block structures, to ensure
the reasonable use of water. 52 Water suppliers can set a "basic use
allocation," providing a reasonable amount of water for the customer's
needs and property characteristics and providing incrementally higher rates
for use in excess of the basic use allocation. 53 Volumetric prices that are
economically structured to encourage conservation and reduce the
inefficient use of water are permissible.54 Undeniably, water conservation
efforts such as these can play a major role in mitigating the effects of
supply reductions from climate change.
III. The Capistrano Decision
Capistrano Taxpayers Association, Inc.

v.

City of San Juan

Capistrano arose from a challenge to a tiered water rate structure
implemented by the City of San Juan Capistrano ("City").56

The rate

structure identified classes of consumers by type and size of property and
developed four budgets for each class based on prior usage patterns: (1)
low, (2) reasonable, (3) excessive, and (4) very excessive. 57 The City did
not try to calculate the incremental cost of providing water at each
consumption level, but instead, it allocated total costs in such a way "that
the anticipated revenues from all four tiers would equal total costs .

. . ."

In fact, the City effectively used revenues from the top tiers to subsidize the
rates of the bottom tiers. The City justified these rates as conservation rates
in that the highest rates were imposed on the highest consumers of water. 59
An association of taxpayers challenged this rate system asserting that the
50. Id
51. A Primer on Water Pricing in the San Diego Region, supra note 45, at I ("Water
conservation is maximized when tiered rates are implemented."); Ellen Hanak, et al., Managing
California'sWater: From Conflict to Reconciliation, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA

311 (2011), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211 EHR.pdf.
52. CAL. WATER CODE § 370 (West 2009).
53. Id. § 372(a)(2)-(4).
54. Id.
55. Hanak, et al., supra note 51.
56. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 367-68, 378-79.
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City's new rate structure violated Proposition 218's mandate to price water
proportional to the cost of the service. Before discussing the results of this
challenge, however, it is useful to summarize the judicial limitations of
water pricing mechanisms in California leading up to the Capistrano
decision.
The relevance of Proposition 218 in water ratemaking largely turns on
the meaning of "fees and charges" defined in Article XIII D, section 2,6
which was interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Bighorn-Desert
View Water Agency v. Verjil.6 1 In Bighorn, the court held that once a
property owner or resident pays connection charges and becomes a
customer of a public water agency, all charges,62 including water rate and
delivery, thereafter are property-related service charges within the meaning
of Article XIII D and Article XIII C, section 3 of the California
Constitution.63 A key inquiry in the case was whether or not the property
owner or tenant was a customer of the public water agency. 4 In effect, the
holding in Bighorn affirmed that water rates are within the scope of
Proposition 218.
Following Bighorn, the California Supreme Court clarified that
agencies bear the burden of proof to demonstrate Proposition 218
compliance in Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc. v. Santa Clara
County Open Space Authority. Thus, in proving the proportionality
requirement, the water agency has the burden of demonstrating that the
contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits
The agency's determinations
conferred on the property in question. 6
regarding whether the benefits are proportional under the California
Constitution must withstand an independent standard of review.66

60. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 2, cl. (e) ("'Fee' or 'charge' means any levy other than an ad
valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a
person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related
service.").
61. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220, 229 (Cal. 2006).
62. Id. at 227. "All charges" include whether the charge is calculated on the basis of
consumption or imposed as a fixed monthly fee.
63. Id.; see also Richmond v. Shasta Comm. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 528 (Cal. 2004)
(clarifying that a water service fee is a fee or charge under Article XIII D if, but only if, it is
imposed "upon a person as an incident of property ownership").
ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES, PROPOSITION 218: LOCAL AGENCY
64.
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE 9 (2007), http://www.acwa.com/products/acwa-issue-guidelines/

proposition-218-local-agency-guidelines-compliance.
65. Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth., 187 P.3d
37, 48 (Cal. 2008).
66.

Id. at 49.
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The City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water District later applied this
standard of review to strike down a tiered rate structure adopted by the
Palmdale Water District.6 7 In Palmdale, the district adopted a tiered rate
structure to encourage efficient use of its surface and groundwater sources
of supply.68 The Palmdale Court focused on the lack of justification in the
record for the differences in the costs of providing water service to each
customer class and also emphasized the importance of promoting efficient
water use and management.69 In Palmdale, the court affirmed that tiered
water pricing structure constitutes a "fee or charge" for the purposes of
Proposition 218 and that water conservation pricing is constitutional so
long as the price does not exceed the proportional cost of the service to the
parcel.7 0
In the case Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, the
California Court of Appeal issued a countervailing interpretation of
Proposition 218. There, the court addressed the legality of that agency's
groundwater augmentation charge pursuant to Proposition 218. The charge
involved a tiered charge imposed for groundwater distribution based on the
geographical differences in the parcels. 1
The court held that the
groundwater augmentation charges did not improperly exceed proportional
costs attributable to the parcel, noting that water agencies manage resources
for the common benefit for all water users. 72
Looking at this line of cases, the Capistrano Court ultimately held
that: (1) Proposition 218 allows the City to pass the capital costs of
building a water recycling plant on to its customers, but the record was
unclear whether the rates for the capital investments of the recycling
operation were improperly allocated to lower-than-average users whose
consumptions did not require water recycling; 73 and (2) the City's tiered
rate pricing structure violates the constitutional requirement that fees not
exceed the proportional costs of service attributable to the parcel because

67. City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
The court rejected the argument that tiered rates were authorized by Article X, section 2, of the
California Constitution because the tiered rates were designed to prevent unreasonable water use.
Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution is the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine,
which mandates that all water use must be reasonable.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 374.
70. Id. at 379.
71. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
72. Id. at 254-55.
73. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
369-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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the City did not carry its burden of proving that the rates of the higher tiers
reflect the costs of service.74 The central focus of this Note is this second
holding, which in and of itself does not create any additional judicial
limitations to water rate jurisprudence.7 5
Despite this holding, Capistrano has been surrounded by extreme
controversy. Governor Brown issued a statement describing the decision as
putting a "straightjacket" on government efforts responding to the severe
drought conditions. 6 There have also been two requests to depublish the
opinion. The first request came from then-California Attorney General,
Kamala Harris, on behalf of the State Water Resources Control Board, and
the second request was from the Association of California Water Agencies,
California State Association of Counties, and League of California Cities
(collectively "Amici Associations").n Much of the concern following
Capistrano,however, is not directed at the central holdings of the case but

74. Id. at 380-81. The analysis of this Note focuses on this second holding.
75. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil, 138 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2006); City of
Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Silicon Valley
Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth., 187 P.3d 37, 48 (Cal. 2008).
76. Governor Brown issued a statement on April 20, 2015: "The practical effect of the
court's decision is to put a straitjacket on local government at a time when maximum flexibility is
needed. My policy is and will continue to be: employ every method possible to ensure water is
conserved across California." Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Issues Statement on 4th
District Court of Appeal Decision, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Apr. 20,

2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18928.
77. Former Attorney General, Kamala Harris, issued a request to depublish the opinion on
behalf of the State Water Resources Control Board, stating that the Court of Appeal's dicta could
be read to cast constitutional doubt on any price structure that imposes a penalty rate for
excessive water use and create confusion regarding Article X, section 2 of the California
Constitution. This request further stated that the opinion "could impede the State's ability to
achieve the reductions in water use required by the Governor's Executive Order." Kamala D.
Harris, Request for Depublication, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD (June 5, 2015),

http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/waterissues/programs/drought/pricing/docs/capistra
The League of California Cities, Association of California Water
no depub-request.pdf.
Agencies, and California State Associations of Counties collectively submitted a request for
depublication on June 12, 2015, on the grounds that: "(1) the Opinion fails to harmonize
provisions of the California Constitution [A]rticle XIII D, section 6 and Article X, Section 2; (2)
it fundamentally misconstrues the nature and scope of the service provided by the public water
providers; and (3) it fails to appropriately consider the judgments of local public agencies in
making the determination necessary to assure that fees imposed as an incident of property
ownership do not exceed 'the proportional costs of the service attributable to the parcel[s]' as
required by [A]rticle XIII D, section 6, subd. (b)(3)." League of California Cities, Request for
Depublication, ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES (June 12, 2015), http://www.

acwa.com/sites/default/files/news/state-budget-fces/2015/06/capistrano-taxpayers-associationvcity-san-juan-capistrano_request.pdf; Howard Mintz, California Drought: High Court Hands
Setback to Water Conservation Fight, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 23, 2015, 9:52 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/drought/ci_28523832/california-drought-high-court-hands-setback
-water-conservation.
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at the overbroad and questionable language used throughout the opinion,
which is described in greater detail below.7 8
First, the court in Capistrano embarks on a lengthy and confusing
discussion on the nexus of Proposition 218 and Article X, section 2 of the
California Constitution. Article X, section 279 enumerates the "reasonable
and beneficial use" doctrine, which establishes that all uses of water must
conform to the standard of reasonable use.80 What is reasonable depends
on the circumstances of each case and cannot be resolved without
considering important statewide concerns. 8 The City justified its pricing
regime by arguing that Proposition 218's cost of service principle must be
balanced against this conservation mandate of Article X, section 2.82 The
court rejected the notion that Article X, section 2 excused the City from the
substantive requirements in Proposition 218. Given that the City had
already acknowledged that it did not even try to calculate the incremental
cost of providing water for each tier,8 3 the discussion of Article X, section 2
should have ended there.
Instead, the opinion launched into a discussion regarding the origins
and interpretation of Article X, section 2, concluding that, if push came to
shove, Proposition 218 might be read to carve out an exception to Article
X, section 2 because Proposition 218 is more recent and more specific. 84
There was no explanation for why Proposition 218-which deals with

78.

"Opinion" is used as shorthand for Capistrano.

79.

CAL. CONST. art X,

§ 2:

It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State
the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water
in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be
limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to
be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of
diversion of water. . ..
This section shall be self-executing, and the
Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this
section contained.
Id
80.
81.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 725-26 (Cal. 1983).
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894-95 (Cal. 1967).

82. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
372-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
83.
84.

Id at 366-67.
Id. at 377.
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property-related fees or charges-is more specific than Article X, section 2,
which only deals with water use.85 The court later conceded that this
statement was unnecessary to its analysis,86 however this statement may
frustrate water service providers' future efforts to harmonize the two
provisions and could imply a partial repeal of Article X, section 2.87
Second, the court's application of Palmdale-which concluded that
Article X, section 2 is not at odds with Proposition 218 so long as water
conservation prices do not exceed the proportional cost requirement-is
questionable.8 8 Under Article X, section 2, reasonableness is determined
While
on a case-by-case basis with statewide concerns in mind.
Capistranowas litigated, California was in a continued state of emergency
from four straight years of severe drought conditions. 89 Palmdale, on the
other hand, was litigated before or possibly even at the beginning of this
drought." Thus, the circumstances in Palmdale may be inapplicable to the
circumstances in Capistrano, where a compelling statewide concern is
The severe drought conditions during Capistrano provide a
present.
stronger justification for above-cost water rates-to ensure that the state's
severely limited water resources are put to a reasonable and beneficial use.
These vastly different environmental circumstances may render Palmdale
and Capistrano incomparable and incompatible. The Capistrano Court's
overreliance on Palmdale without supplementary authority relating to
water conservation and resource management is problematic and may
discourage meaningful conservation-based water pricing.
Third, Capistrano'suse of the term "true cost" is ambiguous. The
court uses the term "true cost" as if there were a single determinable value
that is judicially verifiable, 91 but such a calculation is impossible. 92 Even if
it were possible, the court inconsistently uses the term throughout the
85.

Harris, supra note 77, at 7.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting City of Palmdale v. Palmdale Water Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d
373, 380-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)).
89. See Cal. Exec. Order No. B-29-15, supra note 16.
90. See id.
91.
Id. at 372.
If the phrase "proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel"
(italics added) is to mean anything, it has to be that article XIlii D, section 6,
subdivision (b)(3) assumes that there really is an ascertainable cost of the
service that can be attributed to a specific-hence that little word "the"parcel. Otherwise, the cost of service language would be meaningless.
Id; League of California Cities, supra note 77; Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362.
92.

ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES, supra note 64, at 18.
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opinion. For example, the court assumes that "true cost" is synonymous
with "at-cost" when stating that "nothing in [A]rticle X, section 2, requires
water rates to exceed the true cost of supplying that water, and in fact
pricing water at its true cost is compatible with the article's theme of
conservation with a view toward reasonable and beneficial use."93 But
then, the court acknowledges that incremental water pricing is a good idea
and that in times of drought, water may be more expensive.94 The opinion
also recognizes that Proposition 218 requires that the agencies figure out
the true cost of water, rather than pricing based on water budget. 95
In terms of economics, however, these statements make little sense.
In economics, "true costs" includes all the costs associated with the
negative externalities of goods and services.96 In advocating for at-cost
pricing, the opinion fails to take into account the societal and
environmental costs of water, resulting in a contradictory assertion that atcost pricing is compatible with conservation. That assertion would be
accurate under the economic definition of the term, but that is not the case
here.
Adding even more confusion, the Capistrano opinion later recognized
that water prices might be more expensive in times of drought,
inadvertently applying the economic definition of "true cost" by
internalizing scarcity into the price of water. The Capistrano Court
illustrated this point by citing to a Los Angeles Times article. 97 The article
explained how desalination could be expensive, but added little support as
it fails to mention how the estimated costs were derived and whether these
costs exceed the "true cost" of water. 98 The court's attempt to reconcile atcost water prices and conservation incoherently applied economic
principles in a case about water pricing mechanisms.
Furthermore, this application of water's "true cost"" is based on the
mistaken premise that water service is limited to the cost of "actually

93. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
94.

Id

95. Id.
96. True Cost Economics, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/truecost
economics.asp.
97. Amanda Covarrubias, Santa Barbara Working to Reactivate Mothballed Desalination
Plant, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/califomialla-me-santabarbara-desal-20150303-story.html.
98. Id
99. The opinion also uses the terms "actual cost" and "true marginal cost" interchangeably
with "true cost."
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providing water or delivering water in marginal amounts."'
However, the
California Legislature has endorsed the view that water service means more
The Proposition 218 Omnibus
than just supplying water.10 1
Implementation Act, which was enacted to interpret Proposition 218,
defines "water" as "any system of public improvements intended to provide
for the production, storage, supply, treatment, or distribution of water from
any source."' 02 Thus, an entity that produces, stores, supplies, treats, or
distributes water necessarily provides a water service.1 03 The court in
Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency affirmed this
interpretation of water service and concluded that water service under
Proposition 218 encompasses much more than water delivery.'0
Although the Capistrano Court confirmed this interpretation of water
service, the opinion later inadvertently contradicted this interpretation. In
regard to the holding involving the capital costs of the City's recycling
plant, the Capistrano Court found Griffith's analysis controlling.'0 o The
Capistrano Court even recognized that local agencies have the power to
"furnish sufficient water in the district for any present or future beneficial
use." 106 And yet, the Capistrano Court distinguished Griffith in the
proportionality requirement analysis, stating "Griffith does not excuse
water agencies from ascertaining the true costs of supplying water to
various tiers of usage."' 07 To the extent the CapistranoCourt distinguishes
Griffith to follow constitutional mandates, this Note does not reject
Capistrano's application. But, when read in its entirety, Capistrano's
interpretation of Griffith is contradictory. On one issue, the Capistrano
Court allowed water rates to include a full-range of service costs to
consider and prepare for future water supply shortages; but on the other
issue, the court limited the water rate analysis to the present cost of water
delivery. Accordingly, the Capistranoopinion's interpretation of the "true
cost" of water service is inconsistent throughout the opinion.

100. League of California Cities, supra note 77, at 6 (internal quotations marks omitted);
Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2015).
101. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 250-51 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013).
102. CAL. Gov. CODE § 53750(m).
103. Griffith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 250.
104. Id.
105. The opinion refused to extend Griffith's analysis of whether the allocation of water
rates is a purely discretionary task. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan
Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362, 376-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
106. Id. at 370 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 31020).
107.

Id. at 379-80.
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Fourth, the Capistrano Court failed to recognize the fundamentals of
the nature and scope of the duties of water service providers. 0 8 It appears
the court assumed that water agencies are just commodity providers,' and
in assuming so, the court ignored long established authority that suggests
otherwise.
In 1910, Justice Shaw recognized that the right to stored water is "of
the greatest importance to the future welfare of the state" because it
contributes to the growth, prosperity, and wealth of the state, and its ability
to support a large population.'1 0 This idea was reiterated in, Joslin v. Marin
Municipal Water District, where the court stated that it is "[p]aramount
among [these state-wide considerations of transcendent importance that]
we see the ever increasing need for the conservation of water in the
state[.]""'
And again in Griffith, the court acknowledged that the
defendant, a water agency, was created to manage the resources for the
common benefit of all water users and that identifying and determining
future water supply projects is part of present-day water service.1 2 Taken
together, water agencies are responsible for providing reliable service for
not just the present but future generations as well.
Capistrano'sstrict interpretation of the at-cost requirement ignores the
consequence that heavy water consumers have a greater demand for of
water resources that disproportionally affects future water supply. The
price of water will inevitably increase in the future when a municipality
must expand its water portfolio to compensate for the supply deficiencies.
The higher prices for the higher tiers could be described as a reasonable
reflection of the wasteful water use that compels conservation in the first
place. Under the finding that the City's upper tiered rates are invalid, the
Capistrano Court overlooked water agencies' continuing responsibility to
ensure intergenerational reliability. As such, agencies may be discouraged
from implementing conservation pricing mechanisms in fear of litigation.
Lastly, the Capistranoopinion casts constitutional doubt on any price
structure that imposes a penalty rate for excessive water use." 3
In
Capistrano, the rate structure had four consumption levels in which the
revenues from the top consumption tiers were effectively used to subsidize
108.

League of California Cities, supra note 77, at 6; Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362.
109. League of California Cities, supra note 77, at 6; Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362.
110. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 n.9 (Cal. 1967) (quoting Miller v.
Bay Cities Water Co., 107 P. 115, 128 (Cal. 1910); Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt.
Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 254-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
111. Id.
112. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 254-55 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2013).
113.

Harris, supra note 77, at 4.
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the below-cost rate of the bottom tier.114 In justifying this, the City claimed
that Tier 2 was the "basic use allocation," which provides a reasonable
amount of water for the customer's needs and property characteristics;
"Tier 1 was a lower rate for what the City determined to represent "superior
or more than reasonable conservation efforts";"'5 and Tiers 3 an 4 are
"conservation charges" which pursuant to state law "shall be imposed on
11 6
all increments of water use in the excess of the basic use allocation."
Given that the text of Proposition 218 expressly excludes fines, penalties,
or other monetary charges imposed as a result of a violation of law, one of
the City's justifications for failing to correlate its higher tiered prices to the
cost of service was that these high rates could be categorized as
penalties.'"7 The court rejected this argument because if accepted, the
rationale would make a "mockery of the Constitution" and would create a
loophole so large that it would virtually repeal Proposition 218."' The
court went on to say all that an agency supplying any service would need to
do is to create a rate structure with a penalty rate to circumvent Proposition
218.119 This statement suggests that any penalty rate is unconstitutional,
20
even if the amounts of the penalties are reasonable and justified.1
In addition, this statement could also be read to conflict with the state
statute that encourages allocation-based conservation pricing. 121 This could
chill drought response efforts and discourage water suppliers from
imposing penalties for excessive water use in the future.122 The opinion
had no reason to address the broader question of the constitutionality of
penalty rates because the City had already conceded its failure to meet its
proportionality
with the
compliance
burden of demonstrating
requirement.123

In sum, the overarching issue is that Capistrano could be misused to
discourage future water conservation efforts. However, it is important to
remember that Capistranodoes not impose additional limitations on block-

114. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
367-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
115. CAL. WATER CODE § 372(a)(2) & (a)(3); League of California Cities, supra note 77, at
8; Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362.
116. CAL. WATER CODE § 372(a)(4) & (b)(1); League of California Cities, supra note 77, at
8; Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 362.

119.

Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 378-79.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 378-79.

120.

See ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES, supra note 64, at 9, 16.

121.
122.
123.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 370(a) &
Harris, supra note 77, at 5.

117.
118.

Id

§ 372(a)(2)-(a)(4);

Harris, supra note 77, at 5 n.4.
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pricing structures. Agencies have long known that they must comply with
Proposition 218; Capistranojust reaffirmed this. Moving forward, water
agencies can continue to implement tiered water pricing structures so long
as they provide a showing of the cost of service at each tier.

IV. Future Litigation after Capistrano
Proposition 218 was designed to "constrain local governments ability
to impose assessments; place extensive requirements on local governments
charging assessments; shift the burden of demonstrating assessments'
legality to local government; make it easierfor taxpayers to win lawsuits;
and limit the methods by which local governments exact revenue from
taxpayers without their consent."l 24 Proposition 218 purports to benefit the
taxpayer by discouraging fee or charge increases and in many ways has
accomplished this purpose. New water rates will be closely scrutinized,
and water agencies bear the burden of proof to justify any price hikes. 12 5
After Capistrano, water agencies will likely be more concerned about the
defensibility of conservation-based pricing schemes.1 26 Thus, the issue
becomes how water agencies can continue to impose tiered rate structures
without fear of future litigation.
The most obvious solution to avoid Proposition 218 litigation is
approval by popular vote.1 27 In doing so, however, water agencies must
overcome the obstacles associated with the voting process, such as low
voter participation.128
Voter approval may also be difficult given
taxpayers' aversion to rate increases, as seen in the passage of Proposition
218. If more than fifty percent of the mail-back ballots oppose the rate
hike, then the proposed rate structure will fail.1 29

This is not to say,

however, that voter approval of a new rate structure is impossible. There
have been circumstances in which the proposals have passed. 130
124. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
372 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cty. Open
Space Auth., 187 P.3d 37, 48 (Cal. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Weber, supra note 26, at 829.
126. David Bienick & Fenit Nirappil, Ruling Forces California Water Districts to Review
Rates, KCRA 3 (Apr. 18, 2017, 10:50 PM), http://www.kcra.com/article/ruling-forces-californiawater-districts-to-review-rates/6421919.
127. Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380-81.
128. George Hostetter, Fresno's Prop. 218 Protest Vote Is One for the Ages, THE FRESNO
BEE (Jan. 17, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/articlel9530942.html.
129.

Weber, supra note 26, at 829.

130.

CITY OF DAVIS, CITY OF DAVIS WATER RATE INCREASE PUBLIC HEARING (Mar. 19,

2013), http://cityofdavis.org/home/showdocument?id=1277;

John Holland, TID Approves Large

Water Rate Hike, MERCED SUN-STAR (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.mercedsunstar.com/ news/

local/article6377517.html.
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On the other hand, if choosing to bypass this rate approval process,
water agencies must demonstrate that the allocation of the cost of service
complies with the substantive requirements of Proposition 218. Although
Capistrano stands for the idea that there must be a demonstration of this
proportionality requirement, it is instructive as to what is insufficient to
pass muster under Proposition 218.
In Capistrano, the City allocated the total costs to meet anticipated
revenues from all four tiers.131 The price of each tier increased by
consumption: Tier 1: $2.47, Tier 2: $3.29, Tier 3: $4.94, and Tier 4:
$9.05.132 The differential between Tier 1 and 2 was 1/3, the differential
between Tier 2 and 3 was 1/2, and the differential between Tier 3 and 4
was 5/6.133 The Capistrano opinion noted that the fractional precision of
the difference between the tiers suggested that the City did not attempt to
correlate its rates with the cost of service because such mathematical
tidiness is rare in multi-decimal calculations. 1 34 In addition, the City
followed the recommendations of its rate consultant, and applied the
nationally recognized industry ratemaking standards established by the
American Water Works Association's ("AWWA"), Principles of Water
Rates, Fees and Charges: Manual of Water Supply Practices Ml ("Ml
Manual").1 35 The Capistrano Court stated that such a manual used by
utilities throughout the West Coast might show that an approach is
reasonable, but it cannot excuse utilities from ascertaining the cost of
service.136 The City was unable to show the costs at consumption levels
that would require more expensive supplies. Such computations, however,
would have satisfied Proposition 218.137 Given the facts of Capistrano,
water agencies should develop an administrative record that identifies the
marginal costs of providing water service at each tier.
Water agencies should look at cases that have survived judicial
scrutiny for guidance as to what is sufficient to meet the substantive
requirements of Proposition 218. For example, in Griffith v. Pajaro Valley
Water Management Agency, the court upheld a tiered charge imposed for

131. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
366 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
132. The city did not make a profit on these structures. Id. at 367-68.
133. Id. at 370-71.
134. Id.
135. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by Natural Resources Defense
Council and Planning and Conservation League; Brief of Amici Curie in Support of Appellants,
Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (No. 0048969). The MI manual is the most widely used rate
setting manual among public water purveyors nationally.
136. Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 378-79.
137.

Id. at 380-81.
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groundwater distribution based on the geographical differences in the
parcels.1 38 The water agency established revenue requirements consistent
with industry standards set forth in the Ml Manual and then prepared the
cost of service allocations.139 The court ultimately found that the plaintiffs
were unable to establish that grouping water users based on location was an
unreasonable way to apportion the cost of service.1 40 The court also noted
that Proposition 218 only requires that the apportioning fee or charge shall
not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to the parcel, but it
does not proscribe a particular method to accomplish this.1 4 1 Like
Capistrano, the water agency in Griffith also relied on the Ml Manual to
determine its water rates, however, rate variations were also related to
property location. This distinction is informative in that water agencies, at
the very least, must provide supplemental justifications for rate structures
in addition to following industry standards.
This conclusion is reaffirmed in the case, Morgan v. Imperial
Irrigation District.142 In Morgan, individuals challenged the water
agency's cost of service study on the grounds that the data was poor and
therefore insufficient to meet the proportionality requirement.1 43 There, the
cost of service study had also followed the professional standards
developed by the AWWA, but the water agency specified that it took into
account the character of the water district and its customers.'"
Specifically, the study noted cost differentials between some types of
services, such as the size of water pipe and parcel and type of use
(municipal, industrial, or agricultural).1 45 The study used historical costs
and projections of future costs to determine the revenue requirements
recovered by water rates.146 In calculating consumption for every category
of service, the study used clear measurement data.1 47 However, when this

138. Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
139. The agency established their revenue requirements by: (1) taking the total costs of
chargeable activities, (2) deducting the revenue expected from other sources; and (3) apportioning
the revenue requirement among the users. Id. at 255.
140. Id
141. Id
142. Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 693-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
Note that this case did not involve a tiered block structure.
143. Id.
144. Id The cost of service study here was based on cost of service principles and not value
of services principles.
145.
146.
147.

Id
Id
Id at 94-95.
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data was unavailable, the study created average use calculations from the
water district's staff to estimate data and buttressed these estimates with
data published in the AWWA, data for local municipalities, and local
evapotranspiration rates. 148 Given these processes, the Morgan Court held
that the cost of service study was reliable and supported by substantial
evidence.1 49 The court further stated that even though the data in the
measurement study was not perfect Article XIII D, section 6 in Proposition
218 does not require perfection.' 50 In comparing Morgan and Griffith to
Capistrano, it is clear that a mere reliance on AWWA's Ml Manual is
insufficient to sustain a challenge to the proportionality requirement. Rate
structures that attribute price differentials to geographic location or the
character of the water district or its customers are more likely to pass
judicial scrutiny.
Going forward, water agencies also have the option to factually
distinguish their rate structures or circumstances from Capistrano. The
water agency in Capistrano did not provide a calculation of actual costs;
accordingly, a showing of some calculations of actual costs provides water
agencies with a compelling argument to differentiate their rate structures.
Water agencies can also argue that Morgan and Griffith are more
persuasive. In pursuing these options, water agencies do so at their own
risk. Until the California Supreme Court issues further guidance clarifying
the controlling rule for the proportionality requirement, water agencies
should work to improve their administrative records to increase
accountability and transparency of water rates in order to avoid future
litigation. In doing so, municipalities must identify varying costs of
existing water supply to justify incremental costs and must be able to
explain how these charges comply with Proposition 218. Water agencies
should provide economic and engineering analyses for their cost
accounting methods to support their water rate design. Water pricing is
burdensome and complex because it must take many variables into account.
However, this is the exact type of information that voters called for by
passing Proposition 218.
The procedural and substantive requirements of Proposition 218 are
not the only factor in ratemaking. The primary responsibility of water
agencies is to ensure reliability for both present and future generations. 151

148. Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 694-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
149. Id. at 708-10.
150. Id at 708-09.
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 n.9 (Cal. 1967) (quoting Miller v.
151.
Bay Cities Water Co., 107 P. 115, 128 (Cal. 1910), overruled by City of Lodi v. East Bay
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Municipalities must broaden the perception of water prices from the cost of
delivery to reflect the value of water to society. Cases like Capistrano
have presumed that "cost" applies to the delivery costs of water and that a
quantifiable price exists, but there are no cases that explicitly address the
validity of capturing the non-monetized economic costs under the ambit of
Proposition 218.152 Rather, California law1 53 and precedent supports the
notion that water agencies should consider the intergenerational reliability
of water supply. Recognition of this non-monetized temporal aspect to
water itself affirms that the nature and scope of water supply is not limited
to delivery." The legality of incorporating the non-monetized cost of
water will ultimately depend on whether the value of water falls within the
"cost of service,"' 5 5 but there is no judicial or economic reason as to why
the cost of water should be limited to capital costs and water service
operations and maintenance costs.
At a minimum, at-cost pricing should expand from the price of water
delivery to encompass the costs of avoiding, mitigating, or restoring
environmental impacts in the present year. 156 A further step would include
the opportunity cost of using the public's resources within the at-cost
value. 5 7 This would assume a duty to restore the diminished water supply.
If a duty exists, the costs required to provide a public water supply could be
considered costs within Proposition 2 18.158 If no duty exists, then the cost
would be measured at the cost of delivery.1 59
As previously mentioned, determining the price of water that
represents its full value is difficult to quantify. Often, the minimum value
is all that can be determined.1 60 Though including a minimum value to
reflect the non-monetized water value in the cost of service calculations
will need justification from expert economic opinion,'61 it will provide a
Municipal Utility Dist., 60 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1936); Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency,
163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 254-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)).
152. Weber, supra note 26, at 815.
153. State law explains that it is in the best interest of the people of California to encourage
public entities to voluntarily use allocation-based conservation water pricing, tailored to local
needs and conditions, as a means of increasing water use efficiency and discouraging waste in
both normal and dry-year hydrologic conditions. CAL. WATER CODE § 370(b).
154. Joslin, 429 P.2d at 894 n.9 (quoting Miller, 107 P. at 128, overruled by East Bay
Municipal Utility Dist., 60 P.2d at 439; Griffith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 254-55).
155. Weber, supranote 26, at 821.
156. Id. at 822.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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more accurate price signal to consumers about the societal value of water.
This expanded interpretation of the cost of water recognizes water
agencies' responsibility to provide a reliable water service for all
generations and will have a greater impact on consumption behavior.
Ultimately, courts review these cases not to determine what is right or
reasonable to preserve this system created but rather to determine whether
water plans comply with the constitutional mandates chosen by the
voters.162 In passing Proposition 218, voters made clear that water agencies
may raise the price of water, but they must do so with their consent or in a
way that correlates to the cost of providing that water. After Capistrano,
tiered water pricing structures remain compatible with the California
Constitution, but an agency must do more than just balance the total costs
of service with its total revenue and industry standards. An agency must be
able to provide supplemental cost accounting justifications for any given
tier. In this process, agencies should broaden their interpretation to
encompass both the monetized and non-monetized value of water. By
doing this, agencies will be better equipped to deal with California's
changing hydrology and future population growth.

Conclusion
Climate change has amplified the severity of droughts in California.
Californians must prepare for the possibility of more frequent and
Market-based conservation
persistent periods of limited water supply.
practices and, more specifically, increasing block-pricing structures are
important tools to mitigate these impacts on California's water supply.
Although Capistrano raises concerns in implementing block rate
structures, municipalities should not be discouraged from implementing
them because block-pricing structures remain constitutional. The lesson
from the Capistrano decision is that municipalities must justify the prices
for each corresponding tier, improve their cost-accounting techniques, and
document incremental costs that affect the cost of delivery for current and
future cost of service studies.
Municipalities should also look past the actual costs of delivering
water to incorporate the full cost of water use, including environmental
detriment, intergenerational equity, and scarcity. Although it is difficult to
ascertain the full value of water, it is imperative that municipalities at the
very least incorporate future supply and demand predictions to set a price

162. Capistrano Taxpayers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362,
364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

478

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 44:4

for water that is more reflective of its full value. After all, "We [will] never
know the Worth of Water, till the Well is dry." 1 63

163. THOMAS FULLER, GNOMOLOGIA: ADAGIES AND PROVERBS, WISE SENTENCES AND
WITTY SAYINGS, ANCIENT AND MODERN, FOREIGN AND BRITISH 237 (1732).

